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Abstract 
 
We propose a measure of the probability of crises associated with an aggregate 
indicator, where the percentage of false alarms and the proportion of missed signals can be 
combined to give an appreciation of the vulnerability of an economy. In this perspective, 
the important issue is not only to determine whether a system produces true predictions of 
a crisis, but also whether there are forewarning signs of a forthcoming crisis prior to its 
actual occurrence. To this end, we adopt the approach initiated by Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1998), analyzing each indicator and calculating each threshold separately. We 
depart from this approach in that each country is also analyzed separately, permitting the 
creation of a more “custom-made” early warning system for each one. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
  In this paper we propose a measure of the probability of crises associated with an 
aggregate indicator, where the percentage of false alarms and the proportion of missed signals 
are combined to give an appreciation of the vulnerability of an economy. In this perspective, 
the important issue is not only to determine whether a system produces true predictions of a 
crisis, but also whether there are forewarning signs of a forthcoming crisis prior to its actual 
occurrence. To this end, we adopt a signal extraction approach, following the methodology 
suggested in previous papers by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Berg and Patillo 
(1999), Goldstein et al. (2000), and Edison (2003). However, our interpretation contrasts with 
previous studies in the conception of what a good warning system must be for an emerging 
economy. In the case of the countries treated in this study, a monitoring system with a high 
proportion of false crisis signals is not necessarily something bad, as is suggested in the 
majority of the literature, since it may simply mean that the warning system detects situations 
of increased vulnerability in a context of deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. An 
intertemporal accumulation of false signals can indicate a high probability that a severe crisis 
will actually occur in the near future. Therefore, false alarms may simply indicate the 
deterioration of economic fundamentals and potential forthcoming crises. We propose such an 
indicator in this paper and show that the predicted probabilities of a currency crisis in Russia 
and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, have remained high during the early and mid nineties. In 
contrast, a comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries (such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland) reveals that the probabilities of a crisis were high only a few 
periods prior to the observed crises and low otherwise.  
  The forewarning model we propose in this paper differs with respect to several aspects 
when compared to more conventional forewarning system models based on the signal 
extraction approach. The main differences are threefold.  
  Firstly, for several reasons that are explained later, it seems interesting to include among 
the set of leading indicators a macroeconomic variable that captures the influence of banking 
crises. Here, we use commercial bank deposits and the ratio of credits to GDP as proxies. The 
decrease of commercial bank deposits or the rapid expansion of credits are two vectors of 
banking crises.  
  Secondly, we use quarterly data, rather than annual or monthly data, as is usually the case, 
because an annual periodicity is not informative enough.   3
  Thirdly, to assess the potential risk of a financial crisis, we compute the probability that a 
crisis will occur provided that the composite indicator exceeds certain threshold values. These 
threshold values vary with specific countries, as we have tried to adapt the forewarning 
system to each country’s special features and crisis history. 
    
1.  Introduction 
 
  The proliferation of financial crises in the emerging economies during the nineties led the 
economists to spend great efforts in the building of  forewarning indicators that could help 
prevent the detrimental effects of financial turbulence and assist policymakers in taking 
appropriate actions. In the literature, several modeling approaches have been suggested as 
frameworks that can help forecast financial crises. Firstly, the structural models focus on the 
factors that generate the currency crises : balance of payments crises as described by 
Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984); speculative attack models based on the 
investors’ expectations of monetary policy; financial bubble models with moral hazard 
behaviors (see Krugman, 1998). A second approach consists of models in which the 
occurrence of financial crises is a consequence of contagion channels : commercial trade, 
portfolio re-allocations, political channels (see, among others, Eichengreen et al. (1996), 
Sachs et al. (1996), Glick and Rose (1998), Bussière and Fratzscher (2002), Komulainen and 
Lukkanila (2002)). Thirdly, several empirical models have also been proposed. They are 
based on value at risk analysis, logit/probit regressions, Early Warning Systems, and   
Markovian models (see, among many others, Burkart and Coudert (2002), Abiad (2003), 
Kumar et al. (2003)). 
  In this paper we propose a measure of the probability of crises associated with an 
aggregate indicator, where the percentage of false alarms and the proportion of missed signals 
are combined to give an appreciation of the vulnerability of an economy. In this perspective, 
the important issue is not only to determine whether a system produces true predictions of a 
crisis, but also whether there are forewarning signs of a forthcoming crisis prior to its actual 
occurrence. To this end, we adopt a signal extraction approach, following the methodology 
suggested in previous papers by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Berg and Patillo 
(1999), Goldstein et al. (2000), and Edison (2003). However, our interpretation contrasts with 
previous studies in the conception of what a good warning system must be for an emerging 
economy. It is common wisdom that in constructing warning systems, the economists usually   4
face a dilemma. On one hand, they attempt to construct a system that yields a high percentage 
of correctly predicted crises : in this case, the counterpart is a high proportion of false crisis 
signals. On the other hand, they try to minimize the proportion of false signals, and in this 
case, they must also accept a low proportion of good crisis predictions. In the case of the 
countries treated in this study, a monitoring system with a high proportion of false crisis 
signals is not necessarily something bad, since it may simply mean that the warning system 
detects situations of increased vulnerability in a context of deteriorating macroeconomic 
fundamentals. An intertemporal accumulation of false signals can indicate a high probability 
that a severe crisis will actually occur in the near future. Therefore, false alarms may simply 
indicate the deterioration of economic fundamentals and potential forthcoming crises. We 
propose such an indicator in this paper and show that the predicted probabilities of a currency 
crisis in Russia and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, have remained high during the early and 
mid nineties. In contrast, a comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries 
(such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) reveals that the probabilities of a crisis 
were high only a few periods prior to the observed crises and low otherwise.  
  The forewarning model we propose in this paper differs with respect to several aspects 
when compared to more conventional forewarning system models based on the signal 
extraction approach. The main differences are threefold.  
  Firstly, banking system collapses often coincide with the onset of a currency crisis. For 
example, the biggest difference between Russia and other Eastern European countries was the 
role of the banking system. In the former, credits have continued to be inefficiently directed 
towards the big state-owned industrialized conglomerates, bad loans worsened and the 
absence of supervisory laws induced high inflation and the development of a barter economy. 
In contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe monetary authorities imposed a control of credits 
that was part of a tightening monetary policy, signaling the authorities’ intention to address 
appropriately their inflation problem. Such a decision was positively interpreted by the 
markets and helped assessing the credibility of the monetary policy. In view these 
observations, it seems interesting to include among the set of leading indicators a 
macroeconomic variable that captures the influence of banking crises. Here, we use 
commercial bank deposits and the ratio of credits to GDP as proxies. The decrease of 
commercial bank deposits or the rapid expansion of credits are two vectors of banking crises.  
  Secondly, we use quarterly data, rather than annual or monthly data, as is usually the case. 
Indeed, in the case of Russia, the 1998 crisis was so severe that any preventive action required 
some precision about the exact dating of the crisis. An annual periodicity is not informative   5
enough, because in this case the warning system is unable to predict whether a crisis is going 
to happen at the beginning or at the end of the year.  
  Thirdly, to assess the potential risk of a financial crisis, we compute the probability that a 
crisis will occur provided that the composite indicator exceeds certain threshold values. These 
threshold values vary with specific countries, as we have tried to adapt the forewarning 
system to each country’s special features and crisis history. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents ten macroeconomic leading 
indicators and show that their behavior differs around crisis periods. In Section 3, a composite 
indicator is proposed to estimate the probability of a crisis. Finally, Section 4 concludes.  
 
2.  Single leading indicators for predicting the financial crises 
 
  Financial crises can manifest themselves in several ways : currency crises, banking system 
collapses, high increase of short-term debt, pressure on the domestic interest rate markets, 
high inflationary periods yielding financial bubbles, etc. In all cases, one of the cornerstones 
of financial turbulence in emerging markets is the observation of severe pressure on the 
domestic currency with high costs on the external balance. We accordingly adopt a criterion 
for the definition of a crisis that accounts for both pressures occurring in the exchange rate 
market and diminishing foreign reserves. The market pressure index is defined as follows: 
 
     t t t RESERV REER IND ∆ − ∆ = 2 1 φ φ  (1) 
 
where REER is the real exchange rate and RESERV stands for the country’s foreign reserves. 
Market   pressure is thus observed when the real exchange rate depreciates and when a 
country is confronted with reserve losses.  
  A financial crisis is then defined as follows:  
 
    
⎩
⎨
⎧ ≥
=
otherwise
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t
t , 0
, 1
 (2) 
 
  A crisis occurs when pressures in the exchange rate market and foreign reserve losses are 
very high. By ‘high’, one means that exchange rate depreciation and foreign reserve losses 
have reached a threshold value above which their continued decline is not sustainable. The   6
identification of a crisis is thus conditioned by three important parameters,  c , , 2 1 φ φ . The latter 
must be parameterized (or sometimes estimated) by the modeler. It is common wisdom to 
interpret the weights  2 1,φ φ  as measures of the volatility of the changes occurring in the real 
exchange rate and foreign reserves. We normalize  1 φ  to 1 and define  2 φ  as the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the rate of change of the real exchange rate and the standard deviation of  
foreign reserve variation :  RESERV REER ∆ ∆ = σ σ φ / 2 . The threshold parameter is thus defined as  
 
     IND IND c δσ + =
______
 (3) 
 
where 
______
IND  is the empirical mean of IND and  IND σ  is the standard deviation. A crisis occurs 
when the indicator is δ  standard deviations above its mean. C must be determined optimally, 
in such a way that the crises identified correspond, at least, to the observed episodes of 
currency crises in the exchange rate markets. After trying different values, we finally choose 
75 . 0 = δ . This allows us to capture most of the pressures that the six countries examined in 
this paper have experienced.  
  Our study covers the period starting from the first quarter of 1996 and ending at the last 
quarter of 2003. We use quarterly data for the following countries : Russia, Hungary, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan. Our series are taken from the IMF 
database (IFS statistics). A detailed description of the variables used is given in the appendix. 
 
Evidence of crises provided by the Market Pressure Index 
 
  Figure 1 shows signs of tensions in 1996. Furthermore, the market pressure index crosses 
its threshold value from the third quarter of 1997 until mid-1998. The index as defined above 
has the following advantage. Not only does it detect the year 1998 as a crisis period, but it 
also corroborates the observation that in Russia the 1998 crisis did not appear suddenly, but 
was the height of an economic crisis that lasted many years (cumulative decline in GDP by 
more than 40% between 1989 and 1996, near-hyperinflation) in a context of failure of the 
reform strategies undertaken during the transition period. Indeed, macroeconomic 
fundamentals began to seriously deteriorate in 1996 and 1997 and this was the consequence of 
a combination of factors: deterioration of the terms of trade, fall in oil prices, sharp 
depreciation of the Ruble, increases in interest rates and internal problems (fiscal and debt   7
crises). In addition, the index provides evidence on tensions  in mid to late 1999, as well as at 
the end of the year 2003. 
  Figures 2-6 depict the case of the other five countries. The Russian crisis and the 
slowdown of the Western European countries’ economies had a negative impact on the 
Central and Eastern European countries’ exports, as well as Foreign Direct Investment, 
thereby inducing an important slowdown of their activity from 1998 onwards. Moreover, 
internal issues such as faster growth and higher inflation, as well as fiscal problems, put 
pressures on these countries’ exchange rates. Contagion channels have also been important in 
explaining  financial market turmoil. Figure 6, gives a good illustration of contagion in 
Kazakhstan. As one sees, the  market pressure index has crossed its threshold several times 
between the first quarter of 1998 and the end of 1999, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. 
This can be expected, given the relations and closeness of the two economies. A similar 
observation could apply to Hungary, Poland and the Slovak and Czech Republics, though the 
contagion effects have been delayed over time. The graphs corroborate the historical 
observation that these countries have continued to suffer from contagion effects in the 2000’s. 
It is also important to note that for all of these countries the index gives evidence of the 
influence of the 1997 Czech crisis (triggered by speculative attacks due to weakening 
fundamentals and the Asian crisis), which encouraged the CEECs to move towards greater 
exchange rate flexibility. 
 
Economic indicators 
 
  A central question in the signaling approach is the choice of the crises’ potential 
determinants. For the countries examined in this paper, we consider different categories of 
explanatory variables:  
 
•  a monetary variable : the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP. The upper bound is considered for 
this variable, because expansionary monetary policy and/or a decline in GDP are associated 
with the onset of a crisis.  
•  a capital account variable: the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves.  We take into 
account the upper bound for this variable, because expansionary monetary policy and/or sharp 
declines in reserves usually precede financial crises.  
   8
•  current account variables : 
-  the real exchange rate : lower bound, for real exchange rate overvaluations (-) are linked 
to currency crises.  
-  the value of exports and imports : lower bound for exports and upper bound for imports, 
because a weak external sector is part of a currency crisis.  
-  current account balance measured as the ratio of the difference of exports and imports to 
GDP : lower bound, for the aforementioned reasons.  
•  banking variables :  
-  commercial bank deposits : lower bound, for a loss of deposits occurs as a crisis unfolds. 
-  the ratio of domestic credit to GDP : upper bound, since credit expands prior to a crisis 
and contracts afterwards. 
•  real sector indicators : GDP and GDP growth. The lower bound is considered for 
both these variables, due to the fact that recessions often precede financial crises. 
 
  The important issue here is the stability of the financial sector, as is highlighted in  third 
generation currency crisis models. The motivation behind such a choice is rather intuitive. 
The Russian crisis was part of a huge financial crisis characterized by a weak banking sector 
and several bankruptcies of financial intermediaries. For the other countries, the reasons for 
choosing variables that reflect the stability of the financial sector are similar to those evoked 
when considering the currency crises in the South-East Asian countries: the degree of the 
severity and spread of a currency crisis occurring in a neighboring country depends upon the 
fragility of  their own financial markets, or in other words, the strength of the banking sector.  
  The above variables can be considered as warning indicators of a forthcoming financial 
crisis for several reasons. First, prior to a crisis, domestic credit tends to increase and the rapid 
growth of credit is transformed into a sharp contraction when the crisis appears. Furthermore, 
credit expansion is usually observed in the context of an expansionary monetary policy 
inducing an increase in the ratio of M2 to GDP. Second, a currency crisis generally follows a 
sharp deterioration of the external balance : loss of competitiveness, current account deficits 
and foreign reserve losses. Third, an unstable economic situation is a vector of financial 
crises. Finally, in a context of immature banking sectors, crisis episodes are accompanied by 
losses of commercial bank deposits.  
 
   9
Computing noise-to-signal ratios for single indicators 
 
  We consider an on/off signal and a variable, St, that takes the value 1 if a crisis is signaled 
and 0 otherwise. The prediction of a crisis or a calm period depends upon the behavior of a 
macroeconomic variable. A crisis signal is detected when this variable deviates from its usual 
values beyond a certain threshold level:  
 
    
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
<
≥
=
X X
X X if
S signal
t
t
t
, 0
, 1
:  (4) 
 
where X is a macroeconomic variable. Note that we need a signaling horizon, that is the time 
horizon at which a variable is expected to predict a crisis. In this paper, we consider a 
signaling period of four quarters. To define the optimal value of the threshold  X , we proceed 
as follows. Consider the following events:  
 
 A: the variable predicts a crisis and the crisis occurs within four quarters (good ‘on’ signal)  
 B: the variable predicts a crisis, but no crisis occurs during the signaling period (false crisis 
signal)  
 C: the variable does not predict a crisis, but a crisis occurs (missed crisis signal or false calm 
signal)  
 D: The variable does not predict a crisis and no crisis occurs (good ‘off’ signal)  
 
 These four situations are summarized in the following matrix: 
 
Table 1 : Indicator Performance 
  Crisis within four quarters No crisis within four quarters 
Signal issued by indicator  A B 
No signal issued by indicator  C D 
 
We define the following test:  
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
occur not does crisis a H
against
occurs crisis a H
:
:
1
0
   10
 
or  
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
∪
∪
D B H
against
C A H
:
:
1
0
 
 
  A type I error of this test is the probability of rejecting  0 H  when it is true and is defined 
as  ) / ( C A C P ∪ . A type II error is the probability of accepting  0 H  when  1 H  is true, that is 
) / ( D B B P ∪ . The noise-to-signal ratio is defined as the ratio of type II errors over 1 minus 
type I errors : 
 
    
) / (
) / (
) / ( 1
) / (
C A A P
D B B P
C A C P
D B B P
∪
∪
=
∪ −
∪
= α  (5) 
 
  The noise-to-signal ratio is thus the ratio of false signals to good signals. A 
macroeconomic variable is considered as a good warning indicator of a currency crisis if this 
ratio has values near 0. Accordingly, the threshold  X , to be selected, must minimize the 
above ratio. To do this, we use the quantiles of the variable X and retain those yielding the 
lowest value of α . We also compute the probability of correctly predicting a crisis : 
 
    
) (
) (
B A P
A P
∪
= β  (6) 
 
Performance of  economic indicators 
 
  Tables 2-7 display the results for the six countries. Column 1 reports the quantiles 
corresponding to the minimum noise-to-signal ratio for each indicator. In all cases, the 
quantiles chosen vary with the macroeconomic indicator under consideration. Generally, we 
could say that for the countries where the quantiles chosen are, in majority, situated below 
Q5, the proportion of observations corresponding to crises in higher in comparison with those 
of the periods considered as tranquil. As a consequence, the risk of emitting false signals of 
future calm periods (or missed signals) is low. When the majority of quantiles chosen is 
situated above Q5, the conclusion is the opposite. As a high value for the threshold increases   11
the proportion of tranquil periods, the risk of emitting false signals of calm periods is 
increased.  
  Column 3 reports the noise-to-signal ratio. The indicators have a good explanatory power 
if the ratio is lower than 1. As seen, this is the case for a majority of variables for the six 
countries.  
  For Russia, a bad score is reported by the indicator M2/GDP. This is understandable in a 
context where the degree of intermediation of the economy is very weak. A better score is 
obtained by the real exchange rate, a conclusion that is in line with the usual findings in the 
empirical literature, and the best scores are obtained  by GDP, the ratio of the current account 
to GDP and commercial bank deposits. Though the ratio is lower than 1 for a majority of 
variables, it seems quite difficult to find indicators with a high degree of reliability in the 
prediction of financial crises in Russia. This is seen in the fourth column of Table 2, where the 
ratio of crises accurately predicted has a rather limited explanatory power for many variables, 
even some of those displaying the lowest noise-to-signal ratios. These findings for Russia 
corroborate what was observed historically, namely, the difficulty for multilateral 
international organizations to anticipate the 1998 crisis and to construct reliable forewarning 
systems.  
  For Hungary, the best indicators in terms of noise-to-signal ratios are imports and 
M2/Reserves, which also give  satisfactory scores in terms of percentage of correctly called 
crises and probability of crisis when a warning signal is emitted by these indicators. As far as 
Poland is concerned, the best indicator is indisputably the ratio of the current account to GDP. 
This is not the case for the Slovak Republic, where the best results are given by the real 
effective exchange rate and the commercial bank deposits variable, a situation mirrored 
closely by Kazakhstan, as well as the Czech Republic, where the real effective exchange rate 
also scores high.  
  In general, good scores are often obtained by the real effective exchange rate (REER), as 
in most of the recent literature, and the commercial bank deposits variables (supporting the 
view that banking, financial and currency crises are closely related). However, unsatisfactory 
scores are usually obtained by M2-based variables and the growth rate variable. According to 
historical observations, one can explain these results as follows. On one hand, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have experienced successful transitions through a 
liberalization of the foreign trade sector and a restructuring of their economy, which has 
increased their credibility vis à vis the financial markets. These reforms have contributed to 
attenuate the severity of the speculative attacks on the local currencies. On the other hand, the   12
economic growth that resulted from successful transition policies has been predominantly 
concentrated in services and the impact on the manufacturing sector has been limited. The bad 
performance of the GDP growth might be due to the fact that an aggregate index of growth 
has an imperfect explanatory power. Further, the fact that ratios and growth rates have a lower 
explanatory power than variables expressed in nominal terms, may partly reflect the fact that 
the inflation rate has a high signaling role for the financial markets. It is the successful policy 
of inflation moderation that renders the exports more competitive in the foreign trade markets. 
It is the liberalization of prices that reduces the difference between the domestic and world 
prices, thereby limiting the negative pass-trough effects on the imports and the activity. These 
effects contribute to increase the level of foreign reserves, thereby preventing the risk of a 
financial crisis.  
 
3. Composite indicator and the probability of a crisis 
 
  The next step is to combine the different macroeconomic indicators. This avoids placing 
too strong an emphasis on one variable in particular. Single indicators contain only partial 
information on forthcoming crises. In order to evaluate the forecasting performance of our 
indicators in tracking currency crises, we compute the following noise-to-signal ratio 
weighted indicator:  
 
    ∑ =
j
j
t j t S I * ) / 1 ( α         ( 7 )  
where the index  j denotes a macroeconomic indicator,  j α  is the noise-to-signal ratio obtained 
for the indicator j and s is the signal variable defined above. The signal variable is weighted 
by the inverse of the noise to signal ratio, thereby giving more weight to indicators that 
reported low scores. The performance of this composite indicator can be tested using several 
criteria. Here, it is used to compute the conditional probability of a currency crisis : 
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  We evaluate the probability that a crisis will occur within h quarters (h=4 in this case), 
provided that the composite indicator is included within certain threshold values, 
L
I  (lower 
bound) and  U I  (upper bound). These bounds are determined exogenously and do not vary 
with time, but they do vary from country to country (according to specific characteristics and 
the values of the composite indicator), permitting the establishment of more custom-made 
intervals for each country considered.   
  Once the upper and lower bounds have been determined, we then proceed to the 
calculation of the empirical conditional probability that a crisis will occur within four quarters 
given that the composite indicator is included within a certain interval. The results for these 
calculations are given in Tables 8 to 13. For example, the conditional probability that a crisis 
will occur in Russia within t+3, quarters given that the composite indicator at  t=1 takes the 
value 12, is 0.6. Overall, these calculations give reasonable and coherent results, in that in 
most cases the conditional probability of a crisis tends to increase monotonically with the 
value of the composite indicator, and tends towards 1 (certainty of a crisis) at very high 
indicator values. 
  Table 14 displays simultaneously the value of the composite indicator for each period, the 
conditional probability associated with it, and the incidence of crises, for each country 
studied. Analyzing the behavior of the composite indicator, we clearly distinguish two 
situations. In the cases of Hungary (columns 4-6) and Poland (columns 7-9), the highest 
probabilities of crises are obtained when a crisis is imminent, or when a crisis actually occurs. 
During the periods of non-crisis, the probability values remain relatively small. For the 
remaining countries, the conclusion is slightly different. The probabilities are high for a 
longer period before a crisis (especially at the beginning of the nineties), and in the case of the 
Czech Republic are relatively high for the majority of the period under study. The warning 
system thus seems to perform rather well for these countries.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
  The warning system presented here could be refined by adopting approaches recently 
suggested in the empirical literature, for instance regime switching Markovian early warning 
systems (Arias and Erlandsson (2004)). However, defining an agenda whereby more 
sophisticated models have to be constructed, seems a difficult task in the case of Russia, given 
the degree of the spread and detrimental economic repercussions of the 1998 crisis. The   14
current state of the macroeconomic fundamentals does not exclude a repetition of such a crisis 
in the future. A more promising approach would be to complete our early warning system 
with other standard approaches : value at risk analysis, logit/probit analysis, and event 
analysis. The greatest difficulty is to obtain reliable data over the period of the nineties, which 
reduces the number of potential indicators that can be used in the analysis.  
A general conclusion that emerges from this paper is the following. We have proposed 
a measure of the probability of crises associated to an aggregate indicator, where the 
percentage of false alarms and the proportion of missed signals can be combined to give an 
appreciation of the vulnerability of an economy. In this perspective, the important problem is 
not only whether a system produces true predictions of a crisis, but also whether there are 
forewarning signs of a forthcoming crisis prior its actual occurrence. For purposes of 
prevention, policymakers need to have advance warnings in the medium/long-term rather than 
just a few periods prior to a crisis. Our system seems to perform rather well in this respect for 
most of the countries studied, but a future venue of research might seek to integrate an 
indicator for contagion effects to further improve the performance of an early warning system. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 : Data Description  
 
Indicators  Definition and units 
1. Real exchange rates  Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based) – Index number 
2. M2  Quasi-money – National currency – Millions, Billions 
3. Credit  Domestic credit – National currency – Millions, Billions 
4. Reserves  Total reserves minus gold – US Dollars – Millions, Billions 
5. GDP  GDP, production – National currency – Millions, Billions 
6. Commercial bank 
deposits 
Demand deposits + Government deposits – National currency 
– Millions, Billions 
7. Imports  Imports of goods and services – Millions, Billions 
8. Exports  Exports of goods and services – Millions, Billions. 
 
Source : International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund 
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Table 2 : Performance of Single Indicators : Russia 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called
5 
P(Crisis/Signal)
6
REER  Q1 4  0,31  21,43%  0,75 
M2 / GDP  Q8 7  0,93  14,29%  0,50 
M2 / Reserves  Q9 4  0,31  21,43%  0,75 
Domestic Credit / GDP  Q9 7  0,31  21,43%  0,75 
Exports of Goods and Services  Q3 10  0,23  57,14%  0,80 
Imports of Goods and Services  Q8 7  0,93  14,29%  0,50 
GDP  Q2 7  0,16  42,86%  0,86 
Growth  Q4 13  0,67  50,00%  0,58 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP  Q2 7  0,16  42,86%  0,86 
Commercial Bank Deposits  Q4 13  0,28  71,43%  0,77 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
 
Table 3 : Performance of Single Indicators : Hungary 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal)
REER  Q3 10  0,48    42,11%  0,80 
M2 / GDP  Q8 7  0,63  15,79%  0,75 
M2 / Reserves  Q6 13  0,21  47,37%  0,90 
Domestic Credit / GDP  Q8 7  0,32  31,58%  0,86 
Exports of Goods and Services  Q2 7  0,76  26,32%  0,71 
Imports of Goods and Services  Q6 13  0,21  47,37%  0,90 
GDP  Q2 7  0,76  26,32%  0,71 
Growth  Q8 27  0,71  84,21%  0,73 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP  Q1 4  0,63  15,79%  0,75 
Commercial Bank Deposits  Q2 7  0,76  26,32%  0,71 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
                                     
5 This percentage can be computed as (A/A+C). 
6 This probability corresponds to β, and is calculated as (A/A+B).   17
Table 4 : Performance of Single Indicators : Poland 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal)
REER  Q1 4  0,55      16,67%  0,75 
M2 / GDP  Q5 16  0,73  50,00%  0,69 
M2 / Reserves  Q4 19  0,74  61,11%  0,69 
Domestic Credit / GDP  Q5 16  0,73  50,00%  0,69 
Exports of Goods and Services  Q7 22  0,76  83,33%  0,68 
Imports of Goods and Services  Q3 22  0,58  77,78%  0,74 
GDP  Q1 4  0,55  16,67%  0,75 
Growth  Q1 4  0,55  16,67%  0,75 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP  Q3 10  0,18  50,00%  0,90 
Commercial Bank Deposits  Q1 4  0,55  16,67%  0,75 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
 
Table 5 : Performance of Single Indicators : Slovak Republic 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal)
REER  Q2 7  0,16  42,86%  0,86 
M2 / GDP  Q7 10  0,93  35,71%  0,50 
M2 / Reserves  Q9 4  0,31  21,43%  0,75 
Domestic Credit / GDP  Q5 16  0,73  64,29%  0,56 
Exports of Goods and Services  Q5 16  0,42  78,57%  0,69 
Imports of Goods and Services  Q2 25  0,93  78,57%  0,50 
GDP  Q5 16  0,42  78,57%  0,69 
Growth  Q1 4  0,31  21,43%  0,75 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP  Q3 10  0,62  42,86%  0,60 
Commercial Bank Deposits  Q3 10  0,23  57,14%  0,80 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
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Table 6 : Performance of Single Indicators : Czech Republic 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal)
REER  Q3 10  0,29  42,86%  0,90 
M2 / GDP  Q2 25  0,77  80,95%  0,77 
M2 / Reserves  Q7 10  0,29  42,86%  0,90 
Domestic Credit / GDP  Q8 7  0,45  28,57%  0,86 
Exports of Goods and Services  Q2 7  0,45  28,57%  0,86 
Imports of Goods and Services  Q8 7  0,88  14,29%  0,95 
GDP  Q2 7  0,44  28,57%  0,86 
Growth  Q3 10  0,66  38,10%  0,80 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP  Q7 23  0,46  80,95%  0,85 
Commercial Bank Deposits  Q8 25  0,50  100,00%  0,84 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
 
Table 7 : Performance of Single Indicators : Kazakhstan 
 
 
Advance 
Indicator 
Threshold
Quantile 
Number 
of Crises 
Called 
Noise to 
Signal 
Ratio 
% of  Crises 
Correctly 
Called 
P(Crisis/Signal)
REER  Q2 7  0,14  46,15%  0,86 
M2 / GDP  Q1 28  1,03  84,62%  0,44 
M2 / Reserves  Q1 28  1,03  84,62%  0,44 
Domestic Credit / GDP  Q2 25  0,98  76,92%  0,45 
Exports of Goods and Services  Q4 13  0,51  61,54%  0,62 
Imports of Goods and Services  Q2 25  0,81  84,62%  0,50 
GDP  Q4 13  0,51  61,54%  0,62 
Growth  Q8 25  0,74  92,31%  0,52 
(EXP-IMP)*100 / GDP  Q2 7  0,14  46,15%  0,86 
Commercial Bank Deposits  Q2 7  0,14  46,15%  0,86 
 
Source : Authors’ Calculations 
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Table 14 : Summary Table : Composite Indicator, Conditional Probability and Incidence of Crises 
   RUSSIA  HUNGARY  POLAND  SLOVAK REPUBLIC  CZECH REPUBLIC  KAZAKHSTAN 
   Composite  Conditional  Incidence  Composite  Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional  Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence Composite Conditional Incidence
   Indicator  Probability  of Crises  Indicator  Probability  of Crises  Indicator  Probability  of Crises  Indicator  Probability  of Crises  Indicator  Probability  of Crises  Indicator  Probability  of Crises 
1996Q1 22,2143  1,0000  0  10,6140 1,0000  1  6,8095 0,6364  0  10,6071  0,7500  0  15,7397 1,0000  1  7,2738 0,3571  0 
1996Q2  20,7143 1,0000  1  10,6140 1,0000  1  6,8095 0,6364  0  11,1429  0,7500  0  15,7397 1,0000  1  6,2482 0,3571  0 
1996Q3  14,2857  0,6000  0 12,1930  0,8333  0  6,8095  0,6364  0 11,1429  0,7500  0 15,7397 1,0000  1  4,9055 0,0000  0 
1996Q4  15,7857  1,0000  0  9,2105 0,6667  0  3,1429 0,6250 0  12,7500  0,7500 0  15,7397  1,0000 0 7,2152  0,3571 0 
1997Q1 15,7857  1,0000  0  10,6140 1,0000  1  4,9762  0,6250  1  18,4133 0,8333  0  17,2635 1,0000  1  21,9844 0,8000  0 
1997Q2  20,7143  1,0000  0  6,0526 0,6667  0  1,3095 0,0000  0  8,7704 0,3333  1  14,4444 0,8571  0  29,6328 0,8000  0 
1997Q3  14,2857 0,6000  1  7,4561  0,6667 0 1,3095  0,0000 0 6,0918  0,3333 0 9,8730  0,9000 0  17,9692  0,6667 0 
1997Q4  15,7857 1,0000  1  0,0000  0,1667 0 6,8095  0,6364 0 6,0918  0,3333 0  14,5968  0,8571 0  23,2152  0,8000 0 
1998Q1  25,4286 1,0000  1  4,5614  0,6000 0 1,3095  0,0000 0  13,0561  0,8333 0  10,5333  0,8571 0  15,6254 0,6667  1 
1998Q2  14,2857  0,6000  0  1,4035 0,1667  0  1,3095 0,0000  0  13,0561  0,8333  0  5,4286 0,9000  1  31,6254 1,0000  0 
1998Q3  6,7857 0,5000  0  3,5088 0,6000  0  3,0206 0,6250  0  11,4490  0,7500  0  2,0000  0,1667 1  30,6584  1,0000 1 
1998Q4  10,0000  0,6000  0  3,5088 0,6000  0  8,5206 0,6364  0  22,6990  0,8333  0  6,9778 0,9000  1  24,2408 0,8000  0 
1999Q1 13,2143  0,6000  0  8,2456 0,6667  1  13,1040 1,0000  0  22,1633 0,8333  1  4,8190 0,1667  0  23,0101 0,8000  1 
1999Q2 6,4286  0,5000  0  0,0000  0,1667  0  12,6151 1,0000  1  21,0918  0,8333 0 5,4286  0,9000 0 7,5024 0,3571  1 
1999Q3  3,2143 0,4286  1  1,4035 0,1667  0  11,2401  1,0000  0  10,9286 0,7500  1  2,0000  0,1667 0 3,2234  0,0000 0 
1999Q4  4,7143 0,4286  0  0,0000 0,1667  0  9,8651 0,6364 0  11,4490  0,7500 0 5,6825  0,9000 0 5,5331  0,3571 0 
2000Q1 3,2143  0,4286  0  2,9825  0,6000  0  14,4484 1,0000  1  10,1633 0,7500  1  6,9778  0,9000 0 5,5331  0,3571 0 
2000Q2 0,0000  0,0000  0  1,4035  0,1667  0  12,6151  1,0000 0 5,3571  0,3333 0 8,8825  0,9000 0 4,1905  0,0000 0 
2000Q3 0,0000  0,0000  0  6,1404  0,6667  0  12,6151 1,0000  1  1,0714 0,0000  0  8,8825 0,9000  1  5,5331 0,3571  0 
2000Q4 1,5000  0,0000  0  12,4561  0,8333  0  8,5556  0,6364 0 3,7500  0,2000 0  11,5492  0,8571 0 5,5331  0,3571 0 
2001Q1 1,5000  0,0000  0  12,4561  0,8333  0  8,9484 0,6364  1  3,5204 0,2000  0  10,4063 0,8571  1  5,5331 0,3571  0 
2001Q2 0,0000  0,0000  0  4,7368 0,6000  1  7,1151 0,6364  1  4,2857  0,2000 0  10,0254  0,8571 0 5,5331 0,3571  1 
2001Q3 0,0000  0,0000  0  10,8772 1,0000  1  5,8056  0,6250 0 2,4490  0,0000 0 8,8825  0,9000 0 4,1905  0,0000 0 
2001Q4 1,5000  0,0000  0  10,8772  1,0000  0  4,4306 0,6250  1  5,1276  0,3333 0  10,0254  0,8571 0  12,9177  0,6667 0 
2002Q1 2,5714  0,4286  0  12,4561 0,8333  1  7,1151 0,6364  0  3,5204 0,2000  0  8,2476 0,9000  1  5,5331 0,3571  0 
2002Q2  2,1429 0,4286  0  9,4737 0,6667  0  5,8056 0,6250 0 1,0714  0,0000 0 1,2952  0,0000 0 4,1905  0,0000 0 
2002Q3 1,0714  0,0000  0  10,8772  1,0000  0  5,8056  0,6250 0 1,0714  0,0000 0 3,4540  0,1667 0 5,5331  0,3571 0 
2002Q4 3,6429  0,4286  0  12,4561 0,8333  1  3,0556  0,6250 0 3,7500  0,2000 0 4,5968  0,1667 0 5,5331  0,3571 0 
2003Q1 3,6429  0,4286  0  12,4561  0,8333  0  7,6389  0,6364 0 5,3571  0,3333 0 2,8190  0,1667 0 5,5331  0,3571 0 
2003Q2  2,1429 X  0  12,4561  X  0  5,8056 X  0  1,0714 X  0  2,4381 X  0  4,1905 X  0 
2003Q3  2,1429 X  1  12,4561 X  0 5,8056  X  0 1,0714 X  1  4,5968 X  0  5,5331 X  0 
2003Q4  3,6429 X  0  12,4561  X  0  5,8056 X  0  1,0714 X  0  4,5968 X  0  5,5331 X  0 
                                
Source  :  Authors'  Calculations                              22
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